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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                     
No. 03-4843
                    
CHARLES EDWARD BEATTY,
Appellant
v.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-00690)
District Judge: Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 8, 2004
BEFORE: SLOVITER, VAN ANTWERPEN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed   October 13, 2004  )
                    
OPINION
                    
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Charles Edward Beatty appeals a final order of the District Court granting
summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security (the
2“Commissioner”) on the issue of whether an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly
denied disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
(the “Act”).  The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because we agree with the District Court that the
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s decision affirming a denial of benefits under
the Act.  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).  We must uphold the denial
if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if we would have decided differently as an
original matter.  Hartfranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).  Substantial
evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”  Id.  Because we write for the benefit of the parties involved, we need not
detail the extensive medical and procedural history of this case.  The parties agree that the
relevant time period at issue in this appeal is the period between July 14, 1994 and
December 31, 1995.  
As part of the inquiry in determining whether a claimant is entitled to disability
insurance benefits, an ALJ must consider whether the claimant’s disability prevents him
from doing any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;
Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000).  An ALJ is required to consider all
3the medical evidence and give some reason for discounting evidence that is rejected. 
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429.  When there is a conflict in the evidence, an ALJ may choose
which evidence to credit but “cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong
reason.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  Beatty argues that the ALJ erred in his
determination that he was capable of performing sedentary work with a sit and stand
option because the ALJ failed to consider the medical opinions of one of his treating
physicians, Dr. Kitsko.  He further argues that the District Court erred in conducting its
own evaluation of Dr. Kitsko’s medical record evidence in determining that the ALJ did
not so err.  The Commissioner responds that Dr. Kitsko’s opinions as to Beatty’s residual
functional capacity are essentially identical to those of Beatty’s primary treating
physician, Dr. Marquart, who opined that Beatty was able to perform sedentary work.  
Upon review of the record, it is clear that none of the evidence from Dr. Kitsko is
in conflict with the ALJ’s discussion of the medical record.  Dr. Kitsko originally opined
that Beatty could perform sedentary work that provided for postural changes in his report
dated July 14, 1994, only three days before the time period at issue commenced. 
Although Beatty seeks to disregard this evidence as falling outside the relevant time
period, he has not identified any evidence in the record in which Dr. Kitsko opines
differently as to his functional capacity.  Contrary to Beatty’s assertion, the October 3,
1995 job analysis report establishes that Dr. Kitsko believed him to be physically capable
of performing the duties of gatekeeper at a construction site, an opinion identical to that
4of his primary treating physician Dr. Marquart, which the ALJ discussed at length.  Thus,
there is no indication that the ALJ failed to consider the evidence submitted by Dr.
Kitsko.  We agree with the District Court that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court entered on October
23, 2003, will be affirmed.
